On 5th August 2026, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) was asked to clarify reports suggesting that India and Myanmar were considering a territorial exchange as part of the ongoing border demarcation and fencing process. In response, MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal stated: “… Regarding…India-Myanmar border issues – there are certain areas…on the border between the two countries which are still to be settled, and discussions on those particular sectors are going on between the two sides.” The discussions on the India-Myanmar border come in the wake of the five-day state visit to India by the President of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, H.E. U Min Aung Hlaing, marking his first official visit to India since the 2021 military coup. The boundary discussion also comes amid the ongoing ethnic conflict in Manipur, border fencing, refugee inflows and the scrapping of Free Movement Regimes (FMR).
Historically, the India-Myanmar boundary (un)settlement has been shaped by a complex layer of territorial claims, administrative decisions, surveying, boundary-making, and treaties, such as the Treaty of Yandabo and the Pemberton Line. Among these complex layers was the India-Myanmar Boundary Agreement of 1967. On 10th March 1967, the Governments of India and Burma (now Myanmar) signed a bilateral agreement in Rangoon (present-day Yangon) to formally delimit and demarcate the international boundary between the two countries. The agreement was signed on behalf of Burma by Colonel Kyi Maung and on behalf of India by K. M. Kannampilly, Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs.
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On 18th March 1967, eight days after the boundary agreement, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) informed the United States Department of State from its Embassy in Rangoon that “we are inclined to believe that there are some politically sensitive features in this agreement. Both Burmese and Indian officials in Rangoon are quite close-mouthed about the agreement…if the agreement is politically sensitive, it would presumably be so only with reference to a third party, such as Pakistan or China. If the former, it might involve the Indian troubles with Mizo tribesmen and rumored Pakistani assistance through Burmese territory to these tribesmen.” Contrary to the CIA’s speculation, Minister of State for External Affairs Surinder Pal Singh stated on 13th June 1967 that the boundary agreement of 1967 was only the first step toward fully demarcating the India-Burma boundary. A Joint Boundary Commission was expected to complete the ground demarcation and prepare a final Boundary Treaty. However, the treaty was never concluded, and the demarcation process remained incomplete by the mid-1970s (cited in Paliwal, 2020).
Between the 1960s and 1970s, the border dispute became more visible, especially around Border Pillars (BPs). 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 21, and 23 in Manipur. For Manipur, shifting the border meant the potential loss of substantial areas of land. Moreover, after the Sino-Indian War, 1962, China pressured the Burmese government on the boundary agreement and to shift the border westward. In India, the parliamentary representatives from the Northeast, including Hem Barua and George Gilbert Swell, questioned the “technical accuracy” of the 1967 boundary map and the alignment of the boundary pillars that could result in territory loss.
What initially appeared to be a “technical accuracy” issue over maps and boundary pillars gradually became a question of territorial loss. By 1970, the Ministry of External Affairs was aware that the boundary needed to be resolved diplomatically, as India faced potential territorial losses in the sectors of BPs 6-10, 21, and 23. Then, India proposed adjusting BP 33 west of Tuipang and shifting BP 34 about 200 yards south, giving Burma approximately 0.7 sq. miles in exchange for avoiding changes to BPs 6-10, 21, and 23. Burma rejected the proposal, seeking a further westward realignment that would also transfer Bongmal Thampak to Burma, which India feared would provoke public opposition. A 1974 Survey of India assessment further estimated that relying solely on the 1967 map positions would result in a net loss of approximately 1.4 sq. miles for India between BPs 1 and 39.
In a confidential letter to J.C. Ajmani, the then Director of the North-Eastern Circle, Colonel M. M. Datta, military surveyor, pointed out that India could lose around 1.58 sq. miles by accepting the existing positions of 31 boundary pillars. He noted that, along with the disputed areas around BPs 6-10, 21 and 23, India could lose territory of approximately 2.60 sq. miles due to errors in the 1967 map. He therefore suggested that India should not be put in a position of “losing territory twice”. However, the issue remained unresolved, and the planned boundary treaty was never concluded. In fact, India was willing to cede some territory. However, admitting mapping errors and accepting Burma’s demands risked public opposition.
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While the Centre and survey authorities were concerned about the technical and territorial implications of the boundary, communities living along the border raised a different but closely related concern: how the boundary would affect their everyday lives. Naga leaders also raised concerns that the boundary divided villages, farmlands and traditional systems of authority between India and Burma. In 1968, Nagaland Chief Minister T. N. Angami warned Indira Gandhi that permanent boundary pillars could create problems for Naga villagers whose fields and communities lay on both sides. Gandhi responded that the 1967 agreement only formalised the existing boundary and would not significantly affect people’s lives. However, Angami remained concerned and warned that “if the Government of India were to give away any portion of the land belonging to the Nagas on our side to Burma. Then the situation would become more disturbing on this important international border” (Cited in Paliwal, 2020). In 1971, his successor H. Sema made a similar request to reopen the boundary issue.
The demand was, however, rejected. The two Naga leaders did not raise the issue from a separatist perspective. Their concerns were about the practical impact of the boundary on local communities and their livelihoods, particularly the lack of attention from New Delhi to the concerns of people living along the border.
These concerns did not remain confined to parliamentary debates and negotiations between government officials. They also resurfaced through public protests and political mobilisation in Manipur. The United Committee Manipur (UCM) protested to demand the protection and preservation of the state’s territorial boundaries. In a statement, the UCM President said that people were already upset over the alleged handing over of the Kabaw Valley to Myanmar by the Government of India in exchange for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and warned that they would not remain silent if any further territory of Manipur was given to Myanmar.
In December 2013, Lok Sabha MP Dr. Thokchom Meinya raised questions about the India-Myanmar border, particularly regarding the reported boundary dispute, the status of its resolution, bilateral consultations, protests against border fencing and the government’s plans for a joint survey. Responding on behalf of the Ministry of External Affairs, Minister of State Smt. Preneet Kaur stated that the Government of India did not consider the issue to be a boundary dispute between India and Myanmar. However, she acknowledged that nine boundary pillars in the Manipur sector remained unresolved. She explained that India and Myanmar continued to hold regular consultations through mechanisms, such as Foreign Office Consultations, National Level Meetings and Sectoral Level Meetings (See MEA media release Q No. 2165).
The parliamentary discussion came amid reports that Myanmar troops reportedly crossed the international boundary near Moreh and prepared to establish a temporary camp at Holenphai village in Manipur’s Chandel district, claiming that the area falls within Myanmar’s territory.
The persistence of the issue was also evident in subsequent parliamentary discussions. On 1 st August 2018, Shri K. Bhabananda Singh asked in the Rajya Sabha about the unresolved boundary pillars along the India-Myanmar border and efforts to settle the demarcation issue.
Minister of State (now Minister of Parliamentary Affairs and Minister of Minority Affairs) Kiren Rijiju clarified that the boundary had been settled under the 1967 Boundary Agreement, except that the ground demarcation of nine boundary pillars in Manipur was still incomplete (See Rajya Sabha Starred Question No 157).
The history of the India-Myanmar Boundary Agreement shows that the problem was never simply the absence of an agreement. The gap between an agreement on paper and its actual demarcation on the ground is significant. In 1967, the Government of India described the agreement as the first step toward a final boundary settlement, though the proposed Boundary Treaty was never concluded and several boundary pillars remained unresolved till now.
Decades later, the Government continued to maintain that the boundary was “settled” under the 1967 Agreement while acknowledging that the ground demarcation remained to be settled.
The MEA’s recent statement in August 2026 that certain sectors are still to be settled and that discussions are ongoing echoes this same position. Any attempt to redraw, relocate or exchange territory without first resolving the outstanding discrepancies through transparent joint surveys and consultation with affected border communities could risk repeating the very problems that have remained unresolved for decades.
(The views expressed are personal. Ramachan A Shimray is a researcher whose work focuses on the Indo-Myanmar borderland. He can be contacted at ramachanshimray@gmail.com.)
