THE KUKI insurgency movement and the demand for ‘Any Kuki Tribes’ were inseparable from the outset. The Mizo Accord of 1986 acted as a catalyst for the Kuki insurgency movement. The simultaneous emergence of the Kuki National Front (KNF) and the Kuki National Army (KNA) in 1987–88 revived the demand for recognition of Any Kuki Tribes, as reflected in the memorandum submitted to the then Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, by the Manipur Kuki Tribes Recognition Demand Committee on 28 April 1987. This established parallel tracks. Mutual support—armed enforcement and legal cover—sustained both through the 1990s. The statutory culmination on 8 January 2003 marked the final settlement. The post-2003 shift away from the demand for Kukiland towards electoral politics, the argument goes, confirmed that the real objective was legal recognition within Manipur rather than territorial separation.
The Role of the State Government in the 2003 Recognition
The insertion must be understood in the context of the 1956 correction. Between 1951 and 1956, colonial-era groupings such as ‘Any Kuki Tribe’ and ‘Any Naga Tribe’ were used temporarily. Following a survey by the Kaka Kalelkar Commission (India’s first Backward Classes Commission, established in 1953) and on the recommendation of the then state government, supported by ethnographic verification, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Orders (Amendment) Act, 1956, deleted ‘Any Kuki’ and ‘Any Naga’ and instead recognised 29 distinct Scheduled Tribes by their specific names, as recorded in the Lok Sabha Debates, 13th Session (10–13 September 1956), Volume VII.
This settled framework was, the author argues, altered in 2003.
Efforts to restore AKT began as early as 1979. Chapter VI, paragraphs 6.1–6.2, of the 26th Report of the Lok Sabha Committee on Petitions (2003) records that the Government of Manipur had recommended restoring Any Kuki Tribes in 1979. Subsequently, the Gauhati High Court, in *Thadou Tribe Council North East India & Anr. v. State of Manipur & Ors.*, W.P. (C) No. 945 of 2002, decided on 16 September 2010 and reported at (2011) 1 GLT 363, documented further state government communications dated 24 August 1991 and 3 August 1992 recommending the inclusion of ‘Any Kuki Tribes’. This is further corroborated by Demi-Official (D.O.) Letter No. 2/6/94-CM, dated 3 November 1995, which the then chief minister of Manipur addressed to the then Union minister for welfare, seeking personal intervention to include Any Kuki Tribes in the list of recognised tribes.
According to a letter sent by the present Government of Manipur to the Ministry of Tribal Affairs, the state government at the time, led by the Congress, recommended that the Central Government restore ‘Any Kuki Tribes’ ‘for political reasons’. The government note states: ‘After 47 years of deletion since 1956, Any Kuki Tribes was restored on 8 January 2003 as Entry 18, now Entry 33, on the then State Government’s recommendation for political reasons.’
The amendment enacted in 2002 took effect in 2003, when ‘Any Kuki Tribes’ became Entry 18 (now Entry 33) on Manipur’s Scheduled Tribes list.
The Manipur Cabinet later acknowledged what it considered an error, passing resolutions on 19 October 2018 and 2 January 2023. In a letter dated 8 February 2023, it asked the Ministry to delete AKT.
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Statutory Culmination as the Final Settlement
The insertion of ‘Any Kuki Tribes’ as Entry 18 (now Entry 33) on 8 January 2003 represented, in the author’s view, the statutory culmination—the final settlement—of the Kuki political movement.
The restoration of Any Kuki Tribes, 47 years after its deletion in 1956, was a political settlement rather than an ethnographic correction, the author argues. In its letter dated 8 February 2023 to the Ministry of Tribal Affairs, the Government of Manipur stated: ‘After 47 years of deletion since 1956, Any Kuki Tribes was restored on 8 January 2003 as Entry 18, now Entry 33, on the then State Government’s recommendation for political reasons.’
The author argues that this political settlement explains why Kuki SoO groups agreed to uphold Manipur’s territorial integrity in the SoO preamble dated 22 August 2008. Until then, the KNF and KNO, formed in 1987–88, had demanded a separate homeland by breaking up Manipur’s territory. The author contends that an insurgency demanding a separate homeland could not uphold Manipur’s territorial integrity unless its objective had been achieved within the Constitution. In this interpretation, AKT, restored for political reasons, was that internal settlement: the demand for a separate homeland was relinquished as a territorial claim and institutionalised as a demographic project within Manipur through Entry 33.
This interpretation is linked to the preamble of the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement, a tripartite agreement signed by the KNO, UPF, the Government of Manipur and the Government of India on 22 August 2008. Under it, Kuki SoO groups undertook to abide by the law and uphold Manipur’s territorial integrity. The agreement was followed by the formation of the Kuki Tribe Council and its declaration at Langgol, Imphal, in 2020 that, while Kuki SoO groups might project Kuki as a nation, the Constitution of India recognises Kuki as a Scheduled Tribe of Manipur under the category of Kuki Tribe AKT.
The same position was reaffirmed at the Kuki Tribe Council’s celebration of the recognition of Any Kuki Tribes at M. Songgel Village, Churachandpur, on 22 April 2023. The event was sponsored and supported by Kuki SoO groups, politicians and church leaders, and the gathering again declared that Kuki is a recognised tribe of Manipur. The author further alleges that Kuki political leaders, church leaders, civil society organisations (CSOs) and SoO groups formed the so-called ‘Reconciliation Forum’ (Kihoutoh Committee) to subsume distinct tribes, including the Thadou, under the Kuki Tribe AKT identity. The author also alleges that Thadou organisations, such as Thadou Inpi Manipur and its affiliated bodies, have faced repeated obstruction and threats. The author argues that, had the objective been a separate Kukiland, an ST entry within Manipur would have served no purpose.
The Coercive Arrangement
A central feature of this convergence, the author argues, is the coercive arrangement that sustains it. Kuki SoO and non-SoO armed groups are alleged to provide the force that enables Kuki civil society organisations (CSOs) to impose the Kuki Tribe identity—that is, Any Kuki Tribes (AKT)—on non-Kuki tribes. With this backing, the author alleges, Kuki CSOs can dominate the area, suppress local populations, and influence how identities are declared publicly and recorded in official documents. Through intimidation and coerced enumeration, non-Kuki tribal communities are allegedly listed as Kuki. The author argues that this creates systemic misidentification, erasing distinct heritage while artificially inflating Kuki demographic figures. According to this argument, armed backing enables Kuki CSOs to compel distinct, unarmed non-Kuki peoples to accept the AKT category, thereby increasing the demographic and political weight of a consolidated Kuki society in Manipur. The author cites the alleged continued siege and confinement of Thadou organisations, and the alleged dominance of Kuki CSOs—backed by Kuki SoO and non-SoO armed groups—over the Thadou tribe and its institutions for decades, as further evidence that Entry 33 was itself the settlement. The author also cites incidents such as the reported burning of Thadou leader Pu Michael Lamjathang Haokip’s house on three occasions. The author says some incidents are reported, while many go unreported for fear of reprisals. As a result, the author argues, other indigenous communities in Manipur often misidentify Thadous as Kuki, leaving them blamed during crises for acts they did not commit while their distinct identity and experiences remain unrecognised. The author contends that this misidentification further deepens their persecution.
From Insurgency to Electoral Economy
The author argues that the character of the Kuki armed movement shows that its objective was never a separate homeland. The article claims that Kuki SoO groups were created and sustained by central intelligence and security agencies to counterbalance the NSCN-IM in Manipur’s hill areas. As an example, it cites a report in *The Sangai Express* on 21 May 2005, archived by E-Pao.net, about a war of words between the KRA and KNA. According to that report, KRA commander Lt. DT Haokip allegedly said that the KNO/KRA had received Rs 7 crore from RAW on the assurance that it would counter the NSCN-IM in Manipur’s hill areas, and that this arrangement later contributed to the Kuki–Naga ethnic clash of 1993–95. The author argues that the statement reflects the groups’ alleged patronage by, and impunity under, central security forces. The article further contends that, because the groups were created for counterbalancing rather than for a political cause, the demand for Kukiland lacked a genuine ideological basis. It describes the homeland slogan as a front for control and profit under protection. Under the SoO arrangement, which formally took effect as a tripartite agreement on 22 August 2008, the author argues, this impunity became institutionalised, allowing groups to operate with limited accountability despite alleged violations of ground rules.
The proliferation of more than 25 armed factions was not a sudden rupture but, the author argues, a gradual process that began in 1995, when armed groups entered electoral politics by sponsoring and promoting clan-based candidates for the Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) and the state Legislative Assembly (MLAs). The article says this practice has become entrenched and continues to expand, marking a fundamental shift in the political economy of the insurgency. It argues that Kuki armed groups are no longer fighting for a political solution but are instead pursuing territorial dominance to capture development funds, control state resources and influence electoral mobilisation in the 10 ST-reserved constituencies in the hill areas. In this system, where profit is tied to control over power and resources, the author argues, commanders have an incentive to form their own factions to maximise their individual shares of money and influence. The article concludes that fragmentation is driven by profit and opportunity rather than ideology—the logical outcome, in its view, of groups that originated as security assets rather than as a homeland movement.
The author argues that political demands should be judged by conduct rather than rhetoric. In the article’s view, the receipt of monthly government stipends, combined with active participation in electoral politics and open support for relatives, demonstrates that the demand for a homeland has been abandoned and settled under Entry 33. The author says political movements are sustained by public support and sacrifice, not government payments. When a group’s survival depends on government stipends and development funds, the article argues, its political leverage is weakened. Such financial dependence is presented as tacit acceptance that the demand has been relinquished and reduced to a rehabilitation package. The article describes the renewed demand for ‘Separate Administration’ in the form of a Union Territory modelled on Puducherry as a ploy to mislead the public and keep the arrangement going.
Entry 33: Any Kuki Tribes as a Legal Gateway — Why AKT Must Be Deleted Before the NRC Exercise in Manipur
The author argues that recognising Any Kuki Tribes (AKT) as Entry 18 in 2003 (now Entry 33) creates a legal route through which illegal immigrants could obtain indigenous status. The article says AKT is implemented as a distinct tribe, rather than as a descriptive category, and that certificates are issued simply as ‘Any Kuki Tribes’. It argues that the word ‘Any’ could allow a person claiming to be Kuki to obtain an ST certificate without demonstrating a distinct language, custom or culture. The author characterises these as mandatory tests under Article 342 and argues that the category fails ethnographic benchmarks and relies on self-declaration. The article says this creates scope for administrative misuse and record manipulation. It further argues that obtaining such a certificate could facilitate recognition under Manipur Gazette No. 309, dated 23 September 2022, containing the Manipur ILP (Amendment) Guidelines, 2022. According to the article, paragraph 2A(ii) defines an Indigenous Person as a Meitei/Meetei, Meitei Pangal or recognised ST of Manipur, including AKT-2003, who also meets the residence requirement of having lived in the state no later than 31 December 1961, supported by a record. Paragraph 2A(iii), the article says, defines ‘record’ to include voter lists, Census registers, headcount data and land records. The author argues that AKT provides the recognised-ST-status component, which could lead to inclusion in voter lists and Census house-listings as an ST, as well as land allotment in hill areas under Article 371C. Those voter-list and land records could then be treated as records under paragraph 2A(iii) to support a claim of pre-1961 residence. In this way, the author argues, an ST certificate could generate records that are subsequently used to establish indigeneity under paragraph 2A.
The article says this concern has also been raised by the Government of Manipur. In a letter dated 8 February 2023 to the Ministry of Tribal Affairs, conveying Cabinet decisions of 19 October 2018 and 2 January 2023, the state government reportedly stated that the insertion of AKT had enabled illegal immigrants from neighbouring countries to enrol under the category. The article also cites a June 2025 memorandum from Thadou Inpi Manipur and the Meitei Alliance, which reportedly argued that AKT allows foreigners to claim tribal rights and creates extensive scope for abuse.
In this context, on 2 September 2026, the Manipur Legislative Assembly unanimously adopted its third resolution—following those of 5 August 2022 and 1 March 2024—urging the Centre to update the NRC in Manipur before the next Census. This was followed by Gazette Notification S.O. 4917(E), dated 5 September 2026 [F. No. 9/8/2025-CD (Cen)], issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Office of the Registrar General, India), amending Notification S.O. 99(E), dated 7 January 2026, to defer Census 2027 in Manipur until further notice. Subsequently, on 7 September 2026, Home Minister Govindas Konthoujam informed the House that the state intended to pursue 1951 as the base year for the NRC, although the Government of India had not issued an official or statutory order to that effect.
The author argues that, in a border state with a 398-kilometre porous border and an influx reported after 2021, an open-ended ‘Any’ category without language, custom or culture criteria creates a risk of misuse. The article contends that conducting an NRC while Entry 33 remains in place would be self-defeating: it could classify as indigenous before 1961 people who, the author alleges, obtained records through this route after 2003. The author therefore argues that AKT should be deleted before the NRC exercise; otherwise, the NRC could entrench the demographic changes that the article attributes to Entry 33.
Conclusion
The article’s conclusion is that Kukiland was the slogan and Entry 33 the settlement. It argues that the state government’s recommendation, dating back to 1979 and culminating in legal recognition in 2003, provided the legal mechanism that transformed a territorial demand into what the author describes as demographic control within Manipur. The article contends that, as long as Entry 33 (AKT) remains on the ST list, indigenous identity will remain vulnerable to coercion, official records may remain distorted, and a future NRC could legitimise what the author says AKT has enabled since 2003 by subsuming distinct tribal identities. The author argues that deleting Entry 33 is not an act against any tribe but a restoration of the 1956 ethnographic correction, a step to close what the article describes as a legal route for illegal entry, and a prerequisite for a credible NRC, an accurate Census and lasting peace in Manipur. The article concludes that the insurgency and the legal recognition of AKT were two instruments of a single strategy, and that their convergence is an overlooked part of the history of the Kuki insurgency movement.
The author is an advocate of a distinct Thadou identity and a founding member and adviser to TSA-Bengaluru. Views expressed are personal. He can be reached at chungelmun@gmail.com.
