This is the third series of the article on Naga Kuki War. The article presents a historical and archival examination of the territorial and political transformation of Manipur through the lens of the Naga-Kuki conflict of the 1990s and its continuing consequences. It traces the colonial-era settlement of Kuki populations in Naga territories, the administrative regulation of those settlements under the Manipur State Darbar, postcolonial refugee relief and demographic change, the construction of linguistic and ethnic categories, the emergence of Kuki armed organisations, and the outbreak of the 1992–1993 Naga-Kuki War. The article analyses Naga strategic restraint during the war as a measure that preserved political space for the Naga movement’s international diplomatic engagement, and documents the post-war institutionalisation of armed Kuki structures through the Suspension of Operations framework. It further examines the post-2023 Meitei-Kuki conflict and the transformation of Manipur’s conflict landscape into a wider multi-ethnic territorial confrontation. It argues that the territorial question in Manipur cannot be understood independently of the longer history of migration, settlement, administrative recognition, demographic transformation, armed political mobilisation, and institutional recognition. While the Naga political question retains its distinct historical and international trajectory, processes of territorial reorganisation and armed mobilisation increasingly produce consequences for Naga, Meitei, and other indigenous communities. The article concludes by proposing a programme of archival, legal, scholarly, and informational infrastructure to preserve the documentary record and ensure that the history of Naga ancestral territory is not forgotten.
The Meitei-Kuki Conflict and the Transformation of Manipur’s Conflict Landscape
The Meitei-Kuki conflict that eruptedwith devastating intensity in May 2023 did not emerge from a vacuum. It developed through a longer accumulation of territorial, demographic, constitutional and political tensions that had been building for decades.
The Pre 2023 Political and Territorial Relationship
Before the violence of May 2023, relations between the Meitei and Kuki communities in Manipur had already passed through multiple phases of tension, accommodation, competition and periodic outbreaks of violence. The territorial and demographic transformation examined in the previous sections of this dossier did not affect only Naga communities. Over the course of the twentieth century, the expansion of Kuki settlement, demographic change and political mobilisation also reshaped the relationship between Meitei society and the emerging Kuki political formations.
Also Read: Naga Kuki War, Territorial Transformation and the Making of Multi Ethnic Conflict P-11
The Meitei population of the Imphal valley and the surrounding hill communities had historically interacted through patterns of trade, cultural exchange, political alliance and periodic conflict. The colonial administration’s classification of the hill areas, the introduction of the Inner Line permit system and the subsequent consolidation of the territorial framework of the postcolonial state each contributed to a political geography in which the valley and the hills were governed through different administrative mechanisms.
The years preceding the 2023 conflict saw increasing political mobilisation around issues of forest classification, reservation policies, drug trafficking, land encroachment and the demand for recognition of Scheduled Tribe status by the Meitei community. These issues progressively transformed a complex set of territorial, economic and administrative questions into a sharper ethnic and political polarisation.
The Scheduled Tribe Controversy and the Immediate Trigger
The immediate trigger for the violence of 3 May 2023 was a legal controversy concerning the Meitei community’s claim to Scheduled Tribe status. In April 2023, the Manipur High Court directed the state government to consider the inclusion of the Meitei community in the Scheduled Tribes list. The direction provoked an immediate and intense reaction from Kuki organisations, which argued that Meitei inclusion would fundamentally alter the structure of reservation, land rights and political representation in the state.
The legal controversy rapidly escalated into large scale communal violence. On 3 May 2023, a rally organised by the All Tribal Students’ Union Manipur (ATSUM) against the Meitei claim to ST status was followed by a series of violent incidents across multiple districts. Within days, the violence had spread across the state, with large scale attacks on villages, the burning of houses and places of worship, mass displacement and the establishment of ethnically segregated zones enforced by armed actors.
Also Read: Naga Kuki War, Territorial Transformation and the Making of Multi Ethnic Conflict P-1
The violence that followed was unprecedented in its scale and intensity. More than 200 people were killed in the initial months of the conflict. Tens of thousands were displaced from their homes. Entire villages were destroyed. The state became deeply divided between Kuki dominated and Meitei dominated areas, with fortified checkpoints, segregated movement and the effective territorial partition of large areas of Manipur.
From Communal Violence to Territorial Separation
The 2023 conflict represented a new stage in the territorial politics of Manipur. Unlike earlier episodes of communal violence, the 2023 conflict produced a de facto territorial separation that extended across much of the state. The violence was not limited to clashes between armed groups or outbreaks of mob violence in mixed areas. It produced a systematic reorganisation of territorial control, with armed actors enforcing ethnic boundaries and preventing the return of displaced populations.
The post 2023 territorial configuration bears several characteristics of a large scale territorial reorganisation. Armed actors on both sides have established checkpoints, regulated movement, prevented inter community contact and enforced population separation. The displacement of tens of thousands of people has created ethnically exclusive zones, with Kuki villagers moving into Kuki dominated areas and Meitei villagers displaced from the hill districts into the valley. The result has been described by multiple observers as a de facto ethnic partition of large areas of Manipur.
The Competing Political Projects
The territorial separation produced by the violence is not simply a consequence of communal conflict. It reflects the intersection of competing political projects that had developed over several decades.
On one side, the demand for a separate Kuki administration or the incorporation of Kuki inhabited areas into a larger Kuki political framework continued to animate Kuki political organisations during the post 2023 period. The existing Suspension of Operations framework meant that several Kuki armed organisations remained within a state recognised political process, even as the violence escalated. Kuki political leaders and organisations continued to argue that their communities required territorial and political protection from Meitei demographic, political and economic dominance.
On the other side, the Meitei demand for Scheduled Tribe status was itself linked to a larger constellation of concerns about territorial protection, demographic change, illegal immigration, drug trafficking and economic competition. Meitei organisations argued that their community required constitutional protection to preserve its political, economic and territorial position within the state. The conflict therefore involved not merely ethnic hostility but fundamentally incompatible claims concerning territory, political representation, demographic transformation and access to resources.
Armed Mobilisation and the Post 2023 Conflict
The post 2023 conflict was not fought only between unarmed civilian populations. The Kuki armed organisations that had developed over several decades, and that had been embedded within the Suspension of Operations framework, became active participants in the conflict. The Kuki National Army, the Kuki National Front and other armed formations mobilised for active combat operations against Meitei communities, security forces and other armed actors. The violence involved large scale use of modern weapons, including automatic rifles, mortars and improvised explosive devices.
The Meitei side also witnessed the emergence and strengthening of armed formations. Meitei civil society organisations, cultural associations and community groups established armed wings, acquired weapons and mobilised for territorial defence. The Indian state deployed tens of thousands of security personnel, imposed curfews, suspended internet services and attempted to separate the warring parties. Despite these measures, the violence continued, and the territorial separation deepened.
The post 2023 conflict therefore differed fundamentally from earlier phases of communal violence in Manipur. It involved large scale armed mobilisation on both sides, systematic territorial reorganisation, population displacement and the effective creation of ethnically exclusive zones. The conflict was no longer simply a law and order problem. It represented a fundamental challenge to the territorial and political structure of the state.
The Naga Dimension of the Post 2023 Conflict
The 2023 Meitei Kuki conflict directly affected Naga communities in Manipur. The violence and the territorial separation that followed did not respect Naga territorial boundaries, nor did it respect the political distinction between the Naga Kuki conflict and the Meitei Kuki conflict. Naga villages were attacked, Naga populations were displaced, and Naga areas became part of the larger territorial contest.
In several instances, Kuki armed organisations extended their operations into areas historically inhabited by Naga communities. The same organisations that had previously been involved in the Naga Kuki conflict of the 1990s were now engaged in a conflict with Meitei forces, while continuing to assert territorial claims over areas that Naga communities regarded as their ancestral territory. The Naga position that these territories were historically Naga territories, not Kuki territories, remained unchanged. But the post 2023 conflict added another layer of territorial contestation to areas that were already subject to competing claims.
The relationship between Naga and Meitei communities during this period was complex. Naga organisations expressed concern about the violence, the displacement and the territorial reorganisation that was occurring. But Naga organisations did not align themselves with the Meitei political position, nor did they endorse the Meitei claim to Scheduled Tribe status. The Naga political movement maintained its distinct political identity and its separate political trajectory. Naga villages affected by the post 2023 violence found themselves caught between competing territorial claims, demographic change and the emergence of new political demands.
The Emergence of a Common Territorial Problem
Whatever their differences on the Naga political question, Meitei, Naga and other indigenous communities of Manipur are confronted by overlapping questions concerning territorial change, demographic transformation, political representation, settlement and the consolidation of territorial claims through political and, in some cases, armed structures. The historical evidence examined in this dossier demonstrates that territorial transformation in Manipur has been driven by processes that have affected multiple communities over an extended period. The Naga Kuki conflict of the 1990s, the institutionalisation of armed Kuki structures through the SoO framework, the expansion of settlement, the administrative reclassification of territory, and the post 2023 Meitei Kuki conflict all represent dimensions of a larger territorial question.
This convergence of territorial concerns should not be interpreted as a convergence of the Naga political movement with the political position of the Manipur state or with Meitei majoritarian politics. The Naga question concerning political self determination has its own historical, political and international trajectory. The issue examined here is narrower: the consequences of territorial transformation, demographic change, settlement and competing political claims within Manipur.
The post 2023 conflict therefore represents more than a renewed episode of Meitei Kuki violence. It represents a further stage in the territorial transformation that has been reshaping Manipur for decades. The competing claims to land, resources, political representation and constitutional recognition that are currently being advanced in the name of Kuki and Meitei interests represent challenges that extend beyond the immediate violence of the current conflict.
The Information, International and Territorial Contest
The territorial dispute is now also a contest over historical visibility. In several international advocacy narratives, the territorial question is framed primarily through indigenous rights and humanitarian arguments, while competing accounts of migration, demographic transformation, and internal disagreement receive less attention. The UNC has stated that the Kuki Zo people’s representation to international authorities is “on false territorial foundation and an attempt to befool those authorities” (Nagaland Tribune 2023).
The digital information environment increasingly rewards highly visible, frequently cited, and easily accessible material. Where one historical narrative generates a larger searchable corpus, that narrative can acquire disproportionate visibility in media reporting, search results, and machine generated summaries. The Naga movement therefore needs to build an equivalent documentary infrastructure.
Demographic transformation has accelerated on the ground. Published accounts report that the population classified as “New Kuki” in the 1881 census numbered 17,204, while a later classification reported 448,214 Kuki in Manipur in 2011 (EastMojo 2023; Imphal Times 2023; The Sangai Express 2025). Based on the 2011 Census, Naga groups constitute approximately 51.14 percent, Old Kuki groups 6.4 percent, and New Kuki groups 37.73 percent of the total tribal population (KRCTimes 2024). Because the categories, census methodology, and territorial boundaries changed over time, these figures cannot be treated as a simple population growth series. Their significance lies in the scale of demographic change recorded under successive administrative classifications.
The figures demonstrate changing administrative and demographic distributions, raising the question of how a tribal landscape recorded in 1881 changed into the demographic and territorial configuration of the twenty first century, a question that naturally leads to migration, settlement, refugee rehabilitation, village expansion, land acquisition, administrative reclassification, district creation, political mobilisation, and armed protection.
In the Sadar Hills region, published accounts report substantial increases in the number of Kuki villages between 1971 and 2001, while Naga village numbers remained nearly static. The creation of Kangpokpi district from the Naga majority Senapati district represents the political culmination of decades of settlement change. Demographic settlement can eventually acquire political consequences when the state converts settlement patterns into administrative units, political representation and territorial institutions.
Disputes over communal naming and historical inscriptions further demonstrate how identity classification can acquire territorial significance. The Monsang Naga community denounced the inscription of their tribe on a monolith without their knowledge. The Anal Naga community stated that “Anal tribe was never part of Kuki.” The Chothe Naga community denounced the description of Chothe as a Kuki tribe (Morung Express 2016; e pao.net 2016). Where historical inscriptions, territorial markers, or community identifiers are removed, disputed, or reassigned, the consequence is not merely physical alteration of the landscape. It also affects the documentary memory through which competing claims to territory are constructed.
The UNC has claimed that Manipur is now flooded with illegal immigrants from Myanmar and Bangladesh and that villages are expanding and new villages are being built at a rapid pace. “Columns of illegal camps are being built at an alarming rate near the town of Moreh,” the UNC said (United Naga Council, as cited in India Today NE 2025).
Beyond Restraint: Archive, Law, Scholarship and International Advocacy
Naga restraint prevented the 1990s conflict from becoming the political catastrophe that a wider retaliatory war might have produced. But restraint alone cannot resolve a conflict whose foundations extend beyond the battlefield. The historical record must be reconstructed through archives, maps, census records, customary institutions, land records, legal research, and comparative scholarship.
First, build the archive. Digitise the colonial records, administrative orders, census materials, maps, village records, and oral histories. The documentary record is the foundation of any credible counter narrative.
Second, build the scholarship. Commission source critical historical studies that place Naga and competing narratives side by side. The growing scholarly and advocacy literature surrounding the Kukiland claim must be met with scholarship of equal or greater rigour.
Third, build the legal case. Examine land rights, customary authority, administrative boundaries, ST classification, and Indigenous rights through professional legal research. The SoO framework, the “Any Kuki Tribes” category, and the monolith inscription all present justiciable questions that have never been tested.
Fourth, build the international record. Create professionally documented submissions for the United Nations, the European Parliament, and other international institutions. International recognition of a narrative does not automatically equate to historical validation of that narrative. The strategic objective should therefore be to put the primary documentary record before international institutions so that the territorial question is not evaluated through only one community’s archival narrative.
Fifth, build the information infrastructure. Make the archival evidence searchable, accessible, and properly cited. The information asymmetry that currently exists is the cumulative product of a decade of sustained publication. It can be corrected by a decade of coordinated archival work.
The political mobilisation must continue. The Kukiland map does not distinguish between Tangkhul and Zeliangrong. Coalitions must be built with the Thadou, Hmar, Zomi, and other communities who have formally rejected the Kuki label and whose names are being used without their consent.
Conclusion: The Historical Record and the Naga Political Future
The history examined here points to a conclusion that cannot be avoided. The territorial question in Manipur did not emerge suddenly in the present crisis. It was shaped through successive processes of migration, colonial settlement, administrative regulation, demographic transformation, armed mobilisation and political consolidation. The territorial map visible today is the product of history, not an historical fact standing outside history.
The documentary record of the Manipur State Darbar, colonial ethnographic and administrative material, census records, settlement reports, the history of Kuki armed organisations, the events of 1992–93 and the subsequent transformation of the political landscape must be read together. No single document contains the entire history. The history emerges from the sequence.
That sequence matters because territory is never created by rhetoric alone. It is produced through settlement, administration, institutions, political representation, armed power and eventually international recognition. The struggle over Manipur is therefore also a struggle over the historical record from which competing territorial claims derive their legitimacy.
The Naga political movement understood one dimension of this struggle during the 1990s. It exercised restraint when retaliation could have transformed a political movement into another theatre of ethnic warfare. That restraint preserved political space. The challenge of the present generation is different. The battlefield has expanded into archives, law, scholarship, media, diplomacy and international institutions.
The evidence examined in this dossier also reveals a second dimension of the present crisis. The territorial question that first emerged in the Naga Kuki context has now developed into a wider conflict affecting multiple communities in Manipur. The post 2023 Meitei Kuki violence and its territorial consequences demonstrate that the dynamics of settlement, demographic transformation, administrative reclassification and armed mobilisation examined in the earlier sections of this dossier are not unique to the Naga Kuki relationship. The consequences of demographic change, settlement expansion, territorial reorganisation, competing administrative claims and armed mobilisation increasingly affect Naga, Meitei and other indigenous communities of the state.
This convergence of territorial problems should not be mistaken for a convergence of political objectives. The Naga political movement has its own historical, political and international trajectory, and it cannot be subsumed under any other political project. But the documentary and territorial questions examined in this dossier are no longer confined to one bilateral ethnic relationship. The transformation of Manipur into a multi ethnic territorial conflict has intensified the importance of the historical, archival, legal and documentary work that the Naga movement must undertake. The challenge is no longer simply to defend Naga ancestral territory against one competing territorial claim. The challenge is to ensure that the documentary record of Naga territory, customary authority, settlement history and political continuity is preserved in a form that can withstand competing claims from multiple directions, and to ensure that this record is available to future generations of Naga people, to scholars, to legal institutions and to international bodies concerned with the rights of indigenous peoples.
The Naga movement must therefore preserve what earlier generations experienced, document what the archives contain, recover what has been forgotten, challenge what has been misrepresented, and place the historical record before the world. History cannot be defended by memory alone. It must be defended by evidence. The task is no longer merely to remember what happened. The task is to ensure that the documentary record of what happened cannot be erased.
Author’s Note
This dossier is an evidence based advocacy document examining the historical, territorial, demographic, administrative, and political dimensions of the Naga Kuki conflict in Manipur. It has been prepared through an extensive review of published historical works, colonial and postcolonial administrative records, census materials, government documents, scholarly studies, community statements, contemporary reporting, and other documentary sources. The purpose is not to present a single document as definitive, but to assemble and examine a documentary record from which competing historical and territorial claims can be assessed.
The article is written from a Naga historical and political perspective. The author is an independent researcher and does not claim institutional representation of any government, political organisation, armed group, or civil society body. The arguments presented are the author’s own and are intended to contribute to public documentation, historical inquiry, and informed discussion of the territorial and political questions surrounding Manipur.
Wherever possible, primary sources have been distinguished from secondary accounts, and claims have been attributed to the institutions, organisations, scholars, journalists, or documentary sources from which they originate. References and embedded citations are provided to enable readers to examine the underlying material independently. Some archival materials currently accessible only through secondary reproductions require direct examination of the original records in the National Archives of India, the Manipur State Archives, and other relevant repositories. Such verification remains part of the continuing documentary work surrounding this subject.
The article does not intend to establish criminal liability or legal guilt through historical argument alone. References to alleged conduct by individuals, organisations, armed formations, or state institutions should be understood in the context of the sources cited and the claims documented therein. Where allegations remain contested or require further verification, they should be subjected to appropriate documentary, legal, and scholarly scrutiny. The inclusion of a claim or allegation in this article does not by itself constitute a judicial finding of fact.
The broader purpose of this work is to preserve collective memory through documentary evidence. Historical narratives concerning territory, migration, customary authority, demographic transformation, political representation, and armed conflict should remain open to evidence based examination. The objective is therefore not merely to remember what happened, but to preserve the documentary record in a form that future researchers, institutions, communities, and readers can independently examine and evaluate.
(The views expressed are personal. The author is Independent Researcher on Indo Naga Political Issues)
References
Primary and Archival Sources
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• The Gazetteer of Manipur. 1886. Census and demographic material relating to Manipur, as cited in the article.
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