S.C. JAMIR’s article, “Unveiling Bare Facts of Naga Political Struggle,” published in the Nagaland Post on 20 September 2026, raises important questions about the history and trajectory of the Naga political movement. However, his presentation of the subject appears to rely heavily on the territorial boundaries of the present-day State of Nagaland, thereby overlooking the fact that the Naga political movement predates the creation of Nagaland as a State in December 1963. A historical account of the movement therefore needs to be examined in the context of the geographical distribution of Naga tribes and the political circumstances that existed before the present state boundaries were created.
The use of present administrative boundaries to interpret a political movement that originated much earlier risks creating anachronism. The Naga political question was never confined to the territory that subsequently became the State of Nagaland. Naga communities have historically inhabited areas that today fall within Nagaland, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and northwestern Myanmar. Consequently, the participation, sacrifices and political experiences of Nagas living outside present-day Nagaland cannot reasonably be excluded from the history of the Naga political movement.
The composition of the Naga Club itself illustrates this point. The Naga Club, formed at Kohima in 1918, brought together representatives of several Naga communities. According to the historical record cited in Naga political literature, the 20 signatories associated with the memorandum to the Simon Commission in 1929 represented Angami, Zeliangrong, Rengma, Sema and Lotha communities, along with a Kuki individual associated with Mezoma village. Fourteen of the signatories were Angamis, two were from the Zeliangrong group, and one each represented the Rengma, Sema, Lotha and Kuki communities. Significantly, there was no Ao signatory. This composition itself demonstrates that the political consciousness represented by the Naga Club cannot retrospectively be identified exclusively with one present-day territorial or tribal constituency.
The transformation of the Naga Club into the Naga National Council (NNC) in the mid-1940s further marked an important stage in the institutional development of Naga political consciousness. The early leadership of the NNC included T. Aliba Imti, Mhondamo Kithan and Visar Angami, followed by A.Z. Phizo. The subsequent political movement under Phizo’s leadership became increasingly confrontational, particularly in the context of the demand for Naga self-determination.
The participation of Nagas from areas outside present-day Nagaland in this political history is also evidenced by events in the southern Naga areas. One significant example was the “No Tax” movement and demonstration at Mao-Gate on 27 August 1948. During the confrontation, three Mao Nagas were killed and several others were injured. Athikho Dihrii and Nekhini Modoli, who were associated with the protest, were subsequently imprisoned in Dum Dum prison in Kolkata. A military presence was thereafter established at Mao-Gate. These events indicate that the political and military repercussions of the Naga question were not confined to the territory that later became Nagaland.
Similarly, the Naga Plebiscite of 1951 also had participation from the southern Naga areas. On 16 May 1951, Ashihe Khekho Mao, who had settled in Dimapur, together with neighbouring Khonoma Angami associates, participated in the plebiscite despite the extremely difficult communications prevailing at the time. Kaka D. Iralu, in Nagaland and India: The Blood and the Tears, has also referred to the presence of Mao representatives as observers on behalf of the southern Nagas. Such references deserve consideration when discussing the geographical scope of Naga political participation during this period.
The electoral history of the 1950s and early 1960s provides another illustration. In the 1952 Indian General Election, the NNC called for a boycott, and sections of the Mao and Poumai areas participated in the boycott, although Rishang Keishing of the Tangkhul community was elected from the Outer Manipur constituency. The pattern continued during the 1957 election, when sections of the Mao areas again boycotted the election, even though R. Suisa of the Tangkhul community was elected to Parliament. In 1962, the response was more varied, but Pfosemei (Pudunamei) village, among others, is remembered for completely boycotting the election. These developments demonstrate that political responses among the southern Naga communities were neither uniform nor absent.
The armed conflict also reached the southern Naga areas. From the latter part of the 1950s, clashes between Indian security forces and Naga forces occurred in different areas. On 14 June 1956, a major ambush reportedly took place between Mao-Gate and Khuzama. Besii Chakho Mao is remembered in local accounts as having commanded Naga forces in the southern Japfii area during this period. Subsequently, a permanent army camp was established at Pfosemei (Pudunamei), Mao. Between 1956 and the early 1960s, military operations, arrests, searches, violence and other forms of hardship affected communities in these areas.
These historical experiences make it difficult to sustain the proposition that the southern Nagas were entirely detached from, or unaffected by, the Naga political struggle. At the same time, it would be equally inappropriate to suggest that every Naga community participated in precisely the same manner or with the same degree of political involvement. The history was complex, uneven and shaped by local circumstances. That complexity should be acknowledged rather than reduced to a simple territorial or tribal binary.
The 1964 ceasefire and the subsequent Peace Mission also provide important context. The Peace Mission included figures such as Michael Scott, B. P. Chaliha, Rev. Longri Ao and Jayaprakash Narayan, alongside Naga representatives including Eshuo Ashuli Mao and N. Aram. During this period, several highly educated Tangkhul Nagas also became increasingly involved in the Naga political movement. Their participation should not, however, be generalised to represent the political position of all southern Naga communities.
This distinction is important because the Naga people comprise numerous tribes and communities whose political experiences have not always been identical. To attribute the actions of particular individuals or groups to an entire geographical or tribal population is historically problematic. Such generalisation can obscure rather than illuminate the actual development of Naga political consciousness.
It is in this context that the assertion that the Naga political struggle “was born and fully matured in the soil of Nagaland” requires careful reconsideration. The Naga political movement originated before the State of Nagaland itself existed. The political consciousness expressed through the Naga Club, the memorandum to the Simon Commission, the Naga National Council, the Plebiscite and subsequent political and armed movements cannot be adequately understood through the boundaries of a State created in 1963.
Moreover, describing Nagas from other areas as “alien elements” risks creating an unnecessary distinction between people whose political and historical identities are intertwined. Whatever differences may exist among Naga tribes and political organisations, fellow Nagas living in Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Myanmar cannot simply be rendered “alien” to the historical narrative of the Naga political movement.
The history of any political movement is rarely a straight or uniform journey. Different communities may enter a movement at different moments and participate in different ways. The absence of early participation by one community does not permanently exclude it from a later political process, just as the early participation of another community does not give it exclusive ownership of that political history. The Naga political journey, like a river, has passed through many different regions and communities.
It is therefore important to distinguish between legitimate differences of political opinion and attempts to delegitimise the historical participation of particular Naga communities. A healthy political discourse must allow disagreement without converting disagreement into exclusion. Equally, no individual or organisation should attempt to silence another Naga merely because his or her interpretation of Naga history differs from one’s own.
The controversies surrounding statements made about Naga identity and political history in earlier years demonstrate the continuing sensitivity of these questions. Rather than reopening old divisions, however, the present generation should approach them through historical evidence, mutual respect and intellectual responsibility.
My appeal, therefore, is directed to all sides. Dr. S.C. Jamir, as a senior public figure and former chief minister of Nagaland, carries considerable historical and public responsibility. His interventions in Naga affairs naturally receive attention. It is therefore important that historical claims concerning the Naga political movement be made with precision and with due recognition of the experiences of Nagas across present administrative boundaries.
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At the same time, Naga civil society, student organisations and political groups should exercise restraint in responding to controversial statements. Calls to prohibit, exclude or prevent an individual from speaking or participating in public gatherings can also deepen divisions. Differences should instead be addressed through dialogue, evidence and the democratic principle of freedom of expression.
The larger challenge before the Nagas today is to move beyond narrow tribal loyalties without denying the legitimate identities and histories of individual tribes. Ferdinand Tönnies’s distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity offers a useful conceptual framework here: a society becomes stronger when its members recognise their interdependence while preserving their distinct identities.
The Naga political question has never been the history of one tribe, one region or one present-day State alone. It is a complex history involving multiple communities, territories, political experiences and generations. Recognising this complexity does not diminish the contribution of any particular group; rather, it gives a more complete account of the Naga experience.
The task before the Nagas, therefore, should not be to establish who possesses exclusive ownership of the past, but to understand that past honestly and use it to build a more inclusive future. Historical memory should unite rather than divide. Narrow tribal allegiance and loyalty at the expense of the larger collective interest must gradually give way to a broader Naga consciousness founded on mutual respect, justice, intellectual honesty and solidarity.
The future of the Naga people will ultimately depend not merely upon how strongly individual communities defend their respective historical narratives, but upon their ability to recognise one another as participants in a shared and continuing history.
(The views expressed are personal. The author is Professor, Department of Philosophy, North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong, Meghalaya.)
